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S udan	 presents	 a	 variety	 of	 problems	 for	 mine-action	operations.	Control	of	the	country,	which	had	been	at	war	since	193,	 is	now	divided	be-
tween	 the	 Sudanese	 government	 and	 the	 Sudanese	
People’s	 Liberation	Movement/Army	 (SPLM/A),	with	
government	 forces	 claiming	 the	majority	of	 the	north	
and	 both	 sides	 maintaining	 some	 control	 in	 the	
south.	Both	the	government	and	the	Sudanese	People’s	
Liberation	 Army	 used	 landmines	 throughout	 the	 civil	
war	and	as	a	result,	landmines	now	pose	a	serious	threat	
to	civilians.	For	example,	the	United	Nations	reports	that	
in	200,	 landmines	were	 responsible	 for	more	 than	1	
deaths	and	30	injuries.	The	actual	number	of	deaths	and	
injuries	has	likely	been	higher	but	goes	unreported	due	to	
the	difficulty	of	access	throughout	much	of	the	south.	
Over the past four years, RONCO has established a continuing presence in Sudan, 
following the Nuba Mountains ceasefire, with the deployment of quick-response teams 
to conduct emergency mine-clearance tasks. Currently, RONCO is creating and 
sustaining an indigenous mine-clearance, survey and disposal capacity in southern 
Sudan on behalf of the United Nations. In addition to the threat of extensively mined 
roads and infrastructure, RONCO had to overcome a number of obstacles, including 
inclement weather, disease and an increasing security threat due to rebel activity. 
Sudan’s austere and hostile conditions 
are not dissimilar to those RONCO 
experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
but as RONCO has discovered in those 
two countries, the long-term impact of 
the work far outweighs its challenges.
by John Lundberg [ RONCO Consulting Corporation ]
A	Firm	Foothold:	
RONCO	Operations	in	Sudan
Protecting	 vulnerable	human	popu-
lations.	 The	 ICBL	 has	 done	 a	 great	 ser-
vice	in	raising	awareness	about	the	damage	
caused	 by	 landmines.	Much	 of	 their	 case	
rests	on	the	fact	that	mines	do	not	discrim-
inate	between	combatants	and	noncomba-
tants.	As	we	know,	the	damage	extends	far	
beyond	 the	 physical	 injuries	 themselves.	
The	social	stigma	and	the	added	economic	
burden	 that	 a	 loss	 of	 a	productive	person	
creates	 for	 victims	 and	 their	 families	 are	
additional	harms.	
Further	 harm	 results	 not	 from	 actual	
detonations,	 but	 from	 the	 belief	 that	 land-
mines	are	present	in	the	area.	The	threat	of	
mines	 blocks	 access	 to	 vital	 resources	 such	
as	 land,	 water,	 housing,	 public	 buildings,	
infrastructure	 and	 transport.	 Avoiding	 in-
jury	 requires	 curtailing	 or	 refraining	 from	
securing	subsistence	or	additional	economic	
productivity.	To	make	matters	worse,	mined	
roads	 prevent	 the	 transport	 of	 goods	 once	
collected	 or	 grown,	 thereby	 preventing	 in-
come	and	trade.	
However,	while	 landmines	 can	be	used	
by	someone	on	the	outside	to	keep	a	group	
contained	within	a	confined	territory,	so	too	
can	they	be	used	to	protect	a	group	within	a	
circumscribed	 territory	by	keeping	danger-
ous	persons	out. Landmines	were	originally	
intended	 for	 purposes	 of	 defense;	 the	 fact	
that	some	now	use	them	on	the	offense	does	
not	mean	that	landmines	cease	to	play	this	
defensive	role.
Protecting	 vulnerable	 populations	
from	 armed	 forces.	 Whether	 or	 not	 one	
believes	a	line	between	combatants	and	non-
combatants	 can	 or	 should	 be	 maintained,	
the	fact	is	many	aggressive	parties	are	willing	
to	force	noncombatants	into	their	conflicts.	
Whether	the	noncombatants	are	“innocent”	
or	are	implicated	by	association	and	by	pro-
viding	indirect	support	to	combatants,	they	
require	 defense.	 To	 the	 extent	 landmines	
help	 to	 provide	 that	 defense,	 they	 protect	
children	and	farmers,	viz,	those	people	who	
tend	to	be	the	focal	point	of	the	humanitar-
ian	campaign	to	ban	landmines.	
If	we	 take	 the	moral	 argument	 against	
all	landmine	use	seriously,	then	we	have	to	
conclude	 that	 it	 is	 wrong	 to	 use	mines	 to	
defend	 these	 populations.	 If	 we	 join	 sup-
porters	 of	 the	 ICBL	 in	 stigmatizing	 land-
mine	 use,	 we	must	 also	 stigmatize	 people	
who	want	to	defend	these	populations.	We	
would	 have	 to	 stigmatize	 people	 who	 are	
glad	mines	 are	 used	 to	 defend	 them	 from	
rape	and	murder.	We	would	have	to	stigma-
tize	 families	 of	 soldiers	 who	 are	 glad	 that	
their	 spouses	 and	 children	 have	 one	more	
means	of	ensuring	that	they	come	home.	
Suppose	for	the	moment	the	choice	to	use	
mines	 is	mistaken.	Even	so,	what	 this	war-
rants	is	education,	not	vilification.	But	there	
are	many	cases	where	the	choice	to	use	mines	
was	not	mistaken;	 the	 choice	 to	use	mines	
saved	lives.	For	instance,	it	was	thick	belts	of	
landmines	that	protected	thousands	of	resi-
dents	in	Sarajevo	from	meeting	the	same	fate	
as	Srebrenicans.	Perhaps	next	to	the	photos	
of	people	who	were	injured	by	landmines,	we	
should	 add	 the	 photos	 of	women	 and	 girls	
who	 were	 not	 raped,	 and	 fathers	 and	 sons	
who	were	not	removed	in	the	night.
Self-defense	 of	 vulnerable	 popula-
tions.	 Although	 proponents	 of	 the	 ICBL	
often	work	 in	 or	 come	 from	 countries	 af-
flicted	 by	 landmines,	 the	 framework	 that	
they	have	developed	does	not	seem	to	take	
into	 account	 all	 that	 it	 should.	 There	 is	
something	wrong	with	 the	 strategy	 to	 the	
extent	 that	 it	 includes	vilifying	 those	who	
try	to	protect	parties	who	do	not	wish	to	be	
included	in	conflicts.	But	perhaps	an	even	
more	 troubling	 problem	 pertains	 to	 cases	
of	 landmine	use,	which	the	general	public	
tends	not	to	hear	about.	The	way	one	learns	
of	 these	 cases	 is	 by	 speaking	 to	 people	 in	
the	field:	deminers	and	the	people	who	live	
there.	Consider	the	following	example:
Cambodians	have	endured	a	 longstand-
ing	problem	with	bandits.	Kidnappings	as-
sociated	 with	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge	 received	
attention	but	are	now	dismissed	as	a	thing	of	
the	past.	At	least	some	of	the	deminers	who	
were	 working	 in	 Cambodia	 in	 the	 1990s	
know	that	at	times	it	was	the	villagers	who	
were	laying	mines	to	protect	themselves	from	
attack	and	theft	by	dispersed	Khmer	Rouge	
and	other	bandits.11	Travel	Web	sites	assure	
us	that	it	is	now	safe	to	travel	to	Cambodia.	
Perhaps	for	tourists,	it	is.	
Let	 us	 return	 to	 the	 case	 of	 Sarajevo.	
Deminers	 are	 currently	 assisted	 by	 maps	
showing	where	conflicting	armies	deployed	
mines.	However,	 their	mission	 is	 consider-
ably	 more	 difficult	 because	 not	 all	 mines	
were	deployed	by	military	forces.	According	
to	 Dino	 Bulsuladzic	 of	 the	 University	 of	
Western	 Australia,	 “There	 are	 	zones	 that	
were	 not	mined	 by	 the	military	 but	 rather	
by	civilians	themselves.	One	example	is	that	
of	houses	and	gardens,	more	or	less	isolated,	
[that]	were	mined	by	 their	owners	 for	pro-
tection	 out	 of	 fear	 of	 being	 attacked.	 The	
minefields	of	Sarajevo,	 in	 reality,	 are	many	
more	 than	 those	 marked	 on	 the	 maps.”12	
These	were	civilians	using	mines	to	protect	
themselves	while	United	Nations	peacekeep-
ers	watched	as	everything	these	citizens	held	
dear	was	being	destroyed.
Conclusion
To	demonize	landmines	per se	 is	to	de-
monize	not	only	the	guerrillas	and	the	op-
pressive	regimes	that	are	effectively	judged	
by	their	aims	and	methods	anyway.	There	
are	 people	 who	 use	 mines	 for	 their	 own	
defense	in	the	longstanding	absence	of	ad-
equate	protection	from	police,	the	military	
and	 even	 the	United	Nations.	To	 pretend	
that	landmines	do	not	serve	these	purposes	
is	 to	 obfuscate	 the	 conditions	 of	 the	 vul-
nerable	populations	who	are	 compelled	 to	
use	them	to	defend	themselves	when	no	one	
else	will.	
Although	 people	 who	 oppose	 all	 land-
mine	 use	 have	 not	 caused	 the	 acute	 prob-
lems	 faced	 by	 vulnerable	 communities,	 I	
would	suggest	that	the	stifling	of	debate	and	
the	willful	overlooking	of	such	cases	impli-
cates	them	in	terms	of	skewing	our	response	
to	 these	 communities.	 If	 noncombatants	
turn	 to	 landmines	 for	 self-protection,	 they	
must	be	particularly	 vulnerable.	When	 the	
self-appointed	authorities	on	the	matter	fail	
to	acknowledge	such	cases	exist,	it	makes	it	
sound	 like	 there	 are	no	 such	 cases,	 render-
ing	the	extent	of	their	vulnerability	invisible.	
And	when	we	pretend	landmines	never	help,	
we	worsen	the	situation	of	some	communi-
ties.	Because	by	denying	them	recourse	to	an	
effective	 tool,	we	make	 them	more	 vulner-
able.	And	by	denying	ourselves	 recourse	 to	
an	 effective	 tool,	we	make	 it	 easier	 to	 give	
ourselves	 permission	 to	 claim	 that	 there	 is	
nothing	we	can	do	either.	
See Endnotes, page 109
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concern	over	the	operations	of	the	LRA	had	
a	major	impact	on	RONCO’s	operations	on	
the	Juba-to-Yei	road.
Another	 major	 security	 concern	 arose	
in	 August,	 following	 the	 death	 of	 Dr.	
John	Garang,	 the	 newly	 elected	 First	Vice	
President	of	Sudan.	As	a	result,	the	United	
Nations	 directed	RONCO	 to	 suspend	 op-
erations	 in	Malakal	 for	 six	 days.	 In	 addi-
tion,	 security	 authorities	 were	 in	 the	 area	
stopping	RONCO’s	 local	 nationals	 during	
their	 pre-dawn	 travel	 to	 the	 training/work	
sites.	 These	 precautionary	 detentions	 were	
impacting	 RONCO’s	 ability	 to	 train	 and	
operate.	In	response,	RONCO	created	iden-
tity	cards	for	its	local	nationals	to	vouch	for	
their	employment.
Supply	 challenges.	Keeping	 operations	
supplied	is	hardly	routine	in	Sudan,	as	road	
access	throughout	much	of	the	south	is	dif-
ficult	 due	 to	 inadequate	 infrastructure,	se-
curity	 issues,	 the	 presence	 of	 landmines	
and	 weather	 concerns,	 particularly	 during	
the	 rainy	 season.	 Supplying	 operations	 in	
Malakal	proved	especially	difficult,	 as	 there	
is	no	road	access	to	the	city,	necessitating	the	
airlifting	 or	 barging	 of	 supplies	 down	 the	
Nile—a	five-day	trip	from	the	nearest	port,	
Kosti.	In	addition,	the	limited	road	access	be-
tween	Wau	and	Rumbek	and	the	total	lack	of	
access	between	Rumbek	and	Juba	also	made	
air	transport	a	necessity,	even	though	it	is	ex-
pensive	and,	 in	Sudan,	unreliable,	 sporadic,	
and	sometimes	extremely	limited.
RONCO’s	 supply	challenges	didn’t	end	
there.	 Getting	 equipment	 into	 the	 coun-
try	 has	 proven	 challenging;	 the	Khartoum	
custom	 authorities	 continue	 to	 be	 slow	 in	
releasing	shipments,	not	only	for	RONCO,	
but	 for	 the	United	Nations	and	others.	 In-
country	construction	materials	such	as	steel	
are	 expensive	 to	 procure,	 and	 bricks	 are	
smaller	and	of	lesser	quality	than	elsewhere.	
Gasoline	has	been	of	poor	quality	and	very	
expensive,	 averaging	 as	 much	 as	 US$.0	
per	liter	(US$20.2	per	gallon).	
Weather	and	disease.	Weather	is	a	major	
factor	in	Sudan,	and	it	can	severely	hamper	
operations.	 The	 daytime	 temperature	 can	
reach	more	than	122	F.	During	2003,	exces-
sive	 heat	 precluded	 operations	 for	 1	 days	
in	June,	10	days	in	July,	2	days	in	August	
and	20	days	in	September.	During	the	rainy	
season,	dirt	roads	turn	to	a	thick	mud,	slow-
ing	operations	to	a	crawl	and	hampering	the	
mobility	of	all	vehicles.	
The	terrain	in	southern	Sudan	also	lends	
itself	to	flooding.	The	ground	is	low	and	flat	
with	virtually	no	natural	drainage,	and	the	
soil	 saturates	quickly,	 resulting	 in	 standing	
water	 even	 during	 the	 brief	 periods	 when	
it	 is	not	raining.	At	 times,	 some	areas	have	
been	 under	 as	much	 as	 six	 to	 10	 inches	 of	
standing	 water.	 In	 Malakal	 in	 particular,	
the	mud	made	operations	almost	 impossible	
for	 three-and-a-half	 months	 in	 200,	 from	
August	through	November,	forcing	the	relo-
cation	of	RONCO	training	of	local	nationals	
from	Malakal	to	the	Nuba	Mountains.	While	
flooding	was	 not	 quite	 as	 bad	 in	Rumbek,	
RONCO	operations	 there	were	 shut	 down	
due	 to	 weather	 for	 more	 than	 0	 days	 in	
200.	 Bruce	 Burnett,	 RONCO’s	 Chief	 of	
Party	 in	 Sudan,	 summed	 up	 the	 relentless	
difficulties	 of	 the	 country’s	 weather:	 “In	
the	wet	 season,	nothing	moves;	 and	 in	 the	
dry	 season,	 the	ground	 is	very	hard,	which	
makes	demining	extremely	challenging.”
Disease,	 particularly	 malaria,	 is	 also	 a	
serious	 problem	 in	 Sudan—a	 problem	 ex-
acerbated	 by	 the	 general	 lack	 of	 adequate	
medical	 facilities	 throughout	 the	 south.	
Instructing	personnel	on	the	proper	use	of	a	
malaria	prophylaxis	has	proven	to	be	crucial	
in	maintaining	operational	tempo.	Rats	and	
poisonous	 snakes	 are	 also	 a	 serious	 health	
hazard;	tents	that	seal	at	the	bottom	and	zip	
to	the	top	are	necessary	to	keep	them	out.
Overcoming the Challenges
Historically,	 RONCO’s	 experience	 is	
that	the	impact	of	clearance	operations	fre-
quently	 outweighs	 its	 challenges.	 Despite	
medical,	security,	transportation	and	weath-
er	 issues,	 along	 with	 extended	 downtime	
during	 clearance	 operations	 for	 the	 U.S.	
Department	 of	 State	 from	 2003	 to	 200,	
RONCO	cleared	hundreds	of	kilometers1	of	
roads.	Within	weeks	of	clearing	the	road	to	
Kudru,	the	population	grew	from	1	to	90,	
and	after	the	road	to	Luba	was	cleared,	the	
population	 grew	 from	20	 to	 over	 100,	 sig-
nificant	 increases	 that	 illustrate	 the	 impor-
tance	of	mine	clearance	in	allowing	refugees	
and	internally	displaced	persons	to	return	to	
their	homes.
Clearance	 of	 the	 road	 from	 Juba	 to	Yei	
involved	 overcoming	 numerous	 obstacles;	
since	 its	 completion	 in	November,	 the	 im-
pact	 of	 the	 operation	 is	 already	 having	 a	
visible	effect.	The	United	Nations	designat-
ed	the	road	as	a	high	priority	 for	clearance	
despite	its	location	in	the	center	of	a	highly	
dangerous	 area	 near	 the	 known	 location	
of	LRA	 forces.	While	 an	 armed	 section	 of	
U.N.-supplied	Bangladeshi	soldiers	provided	
security	at	the	task	site,	they	were	unable	to	
provide	an	armed	escort	for	supply	runs	into	
Juba,	 forcing	 re-supply	 by	 air.	The	 cleared	
road	now	serves	as	a	much-needed	route	for	
aid	organizations	and	returning	refugees	and	
IDPs,	and	its	clearance	has	facilitated	trade	
with	Uganda	and	the	Democratic	Republic	
of	 the	Congo,	 providing	 for	 the	 economic	
revitalization	of	the	region.	
RONCO	is	pleased	to	commit	to	build-
ing	 a	 local	 mine-action	 capacity	 in	 Sudan	
and	to	bringing	long-term	stability	and	de-
velopment	 to	 the	 country.	With	 this	 help,	
Sudan	will	 soon	 have	 a	 growing	 ability	 to	
independently	sustain	its	own	demining	and	
clearance	operations.
See Endnotes, page 109
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Internally	 displaced	 persons	 fleeing	 conflict	
areas	 such	 as	 the	Darfur	 region	 are	 at	 par-
ticular	risk	because	they	have	little	or	no	local	
knowledge	of	potential	threats	and	are	often	
forced	 to	 move	 regardless	 of	 the	 potential	
landmine	problem.
Both	 the	 Sudanese	 government	 and	 the	
SPLA	 have	 accepted	 assistance	 from	 the	
United	Nations,	 which	 is	 in	 the	 process	 of	
implementing	 a	 plan	 to	 eliminate	 Sudan’s	
landmine	threat.	In	2002,	the	United	Nations	
established	the	National	Mine	Action	Office	
in	 Khartoum,	 along	 with	 regional	 offices	
in	 central	 and	 southern	Sudan,	 and	various	
suboffices	scattered	throughout	the	country.	
From	these	locations,	the	United	Nations	car-
ries	out	all	aspects	of	mine	action,	including	
mine	 clearance,	mine-risk	 education,	 survi-
vor	assistance	and	stockpile	destruction.	The	
NMAO	is	responsible	for	coordinating	those	
efforts	 and	 helping	 build	 a	 lasting	 mine-
action	presence	in	the	region.	Unfortunately,	
its	operations	have	often	been	interrupted	by	
the	ongoing	conflict.
Following	 the	 most	 recent	 peace-treaty	
agreement	between	the	government	and	the	
SPLA	in	January	200,	 the	United	Nations	
moved	quickly	to	establish	the	U.N.	Advance	
Mission	 in	 Sudan	 with	 the	 goal	 of	 help-
ing	to	ensure	a	lasting	peace.	It	was	quickly	
evident	 that	 mine-affected	 roads	 severely	
curtailed	relief	efforts	and	prevented	develop-
ment	aid	from	reaching	its	destination,	also	
hampering	 peacekeeping	 activities	 and	 af-
fecting	 the	 food	 supply	 of	 more	 than	 two	
million	people.	
The RONCO Response
As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 above	 conditions,	 in	
May	 200,	 the	United	Nations	 contracted	
RONCO	 to	 provide	 the	 mine-action	 ca-
pacity	 necessary	 to	 support	 its	 programs.	
In	 response,	 RONCO	 deployed	 two	 in-
ternational	 clearance	 teams	 to	 conduct	
emergency	clearance	tasks	and	a	training	
team	 to	 develop	 a	 Sudanese	 demining/
explosive	 ordnance	 disposal	 capacity	 in	
Wau	and	Malakal.	Local	capacity	was	to	be	
developed	in	the	following	areas:
•	 Emergency	EOD
•	 Mine	clearance
•	 Battle-area	clearance
•	 Bunker	and	stockpile	clearance
RONCO	was	uniquely	prepared	to	quick-
ly	 respond	 to	 the	 United	 Nations’	 needs,	
having	 extensive	 experience	 creating	 and	
deploying	 its	 Quick	 Reaction	 Demining	
Force,	a	Mozambique-based	team	developed	
to	respond	to	emergency	tasks	on	short	no-
tice.	 RONCO	 initially	 deployed	 this	 force	
to	 Sudan	 in	 2002,	 following	 the	 ceasefire	
agreement,	 where	 it	 greatly	 aided	 the	 safe	
return	 of	 internally	 displaced	 persons	 and	
increased	 the	 flow	 of	 humanitarian	 assis-
tance	 through	 the	 Nuba	 Mountains.	 But	
the	200	Sudanese	deployment	necessitated	
a	more	 permanent	 force	 and	 the	 rapid	 de-
velopment	 of	 local	 capacity.	 RONCO’s	 as-
sistance	 included	a	management	 team,	 two	
international	clearance	teams	and	two	train-
ing	teams—each	complete	with	medical	and	
support	 staff,	 interpreters	 and	 all	 adminis-
trative,	 technical	 and	 logistical	 resources	
required.	In	 just	one	month,	 this	 force	was	
fully	 operational.	 It	 had	 established	 a	 liai-
son	office	 in	Khartoum,	completed	recruit-
ment	of	local	nationals,	established	two	base	
camps	 in	Malakal	 and	Rumbek,	 begun	 all	
training	preparations,	and	completed	all	cer-
tification	requirements.	Moreover,	the	force	
was	flexible	 enough	 to	 take	on	a	 variety	of	
EOD/demining	tasks,	quickly	and	efficient-
ly	 train	a	 local	capacity,	and	cope	with	 the	
unique	challenges	of	demining	in	Sudan.
In	September,	under	two	additional	U.N.	
contracts,	 RONCO	 began	 training	 EOD,	
battle-area	 clearance,	 demining	 and	 mine-
risk	education	teams	to	increase	capacity	in	
the	 cities	 of	 Juba	 and	Ed	Damazin.	Eight	
mine-detection	dog	teams	were	also	trained	
in	Kadugli,	in	central	Sudan,	where	they	are	
assigned	 to	 support	 RONCO’s	 demining	
teams,	 although	 they	 have	 also	 briefly	
deployed	in	support	of	two	other	clearance	
organizations	in	the	south.	Finally,	a	survey	
capacity	 was	 deployed	 to	 Wau.	 Since	 the	
initial	 training	 of	 the	 Sudanese	 mine-
action	 team	 in	May,	RONCO	teams	have	
been	involved	in	a	variety	of	clearance	tasks	
critical	 to	 U.N.	 operations,	 including	 the	
destruction	 of	weapons	 caches,	 battle-area	
clearance	 on	 future	 U.N.	 sites,	 and	 road-
clearance	tasks	crucial	to	the	relief	effort	in	
southern	Sudan.	
The Challenges of Operating
In Sudan
Based	 on	 their	 long	 history	 of	 operat-
ing	in	austere	environments,	most	recently	
in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan,	RONCO’s	teams	
were	prepared	for	the	challenges	of	operat-
ing	 in	 a	 remote	 and	 hostile	 environment.	
Nevertheless,	operations	in	southern	Sudan	
proved	 far	 from	 routine,	 and	 the	 difficul-
ties	 of	 security,	 supply,	 lack	 of	 transporta-
tion	 infrastructure	 and	 the	 inhospitable	
weather	proved	to	be	a	persistent	challenge	
to	RONCO	operations	in	the	country.
Security	concerns.	The	Lord’s	Resistance	
Army,	a	rebel	group	that	routinely	crosses	the	
border	 from	Uganda	 into	 southern	 Sudan,	
is	 a	 concern	 for	 demining	 operations	 in	
the	 area.	 The	 group	 recently	 ambushed	 a	
Fondation Suisse de Déminage	 convoy	 near	
Juba	and	killed	two	deminers.	As	a	result	of	
this	incident	and	a	continued	LRA	presence	
in	the	area,	RONCO	was	directed	to	close	its	
forward	camp	and	fall	back	to	its	base	camp	
at	Juba	until	the	situation	stabilized.	A	num-
ber	of	areas	in	the	south	are	now	considered	
off	limits,	and	many	areas	require	the	pres-
ence	 of	 armed	 escorts.	 As	 discussed	 below,	
Flooding during the rainy season made the roads in Malakal impassable at times.
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